WASHINGTON -- United States Senator Mary Landrieu, D-La., today unveiled the results of a nine-month investigation by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Disaster Recovery Subcommittee, which she chairs, that examines the bungled federal housing response following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The investigation is both a conclusive analysis of what went wrong in the Bush Administration's failed disaster response, and a blueprint for future reform.

"After more than $15 billion spent on disaster housing, multiple pieces of legislation, and five public hearings, FEMA is still resisting change, rejecting innovation and unprepared to plan for housing during a catastrophic disaster," Sen. Landrieu said. "This is really a tragic indictment of the previous administration's failure to recognize that government does need to work. In times of catastrophe and great challenges, government must do its part. This report shows that when people on the Gulf Coast were working to reestablish their lives, their livelihood and their communities, government failed to adequately provide the key to recovery -- housing."

This is the first and only comprehensive investigation of the housing catastrophe that ensued after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast within three weeks of each other. It reveals that HUD sought to play a greater role in housing recovery, but the Bush Administration rejected HUD's efforts. The report includes e-mails and interviews with high-level officials, and concludes with 10 pages of recommendations for reform that are the most thorough series of congressional reform proposals for post-disaster housing offered since the storms.

The sad story of FEMA's inadequate catastrophic planning began in 2002, when FEMA ignored its own documents demonstrated that they were not prepared. In 2002 and 2004, FEMA prepared internal strategy documents recognizing that they needed long-term housing strategies, and acknowledging that their usual practices, programs and personnel would not sufficiently meet post-catastrophe needs. Just months before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA conducted the Hurricane Pam exercise, a simulated Category 5 storm, for planning and training.

The exercise predicted that more than 600,000 homes would be damaged and more than 450,000 homes would be destroyed, that temporary housing would last longer than normal, and that limited rental units would be available. In Katrina and Rita's aftermath, the actual numbers were very similar to those predicted in the Pam exercise. Despite anticipating these results in a catastrophic storm, FEMA did not enact policies to handle such a disaster.

FEMA rejected HUD's involvement, kicking off a chaotic chain of events. Within weeks after Hurricane Katrina and Rita made landfall, FEMA determined that it would be the primary provider of housing assistance, relegating HUD to a subsidiary role. As the recognized federal authority in housing assistance, HUD sought a principle role. However, HUD ultimately assisted only between 10,000 and 20,000 individuals in the first several months after Katrina and Rita, less than one percent of the total displaced population.

"Purchase trailers until I say stop": Early in its ad hoc response, FEMA made the decision to rely heavily on manufactured housing such as trailers, which have proved to be costly, cumbersome and ridden with formaldehyde.

"The Administration said they had a plan — the trailers were on the way," Sen. Landrieu said.

"A 16X6 trailer was wholly inadequate for families. They were parked miles away from where their job was, miles from where their church once stood, and miles away from their neighborhood."

According to a Department of Homeland Security Inspector General estimate, the total cost of providing a single trailer for 18 months ranged from $59,150 to $100,000 per unit. In total, FEMA spent anywhere from $5.5 billion to $7.2 billion on purchasing, installing and maintaining trailers.

"The Bush Administration — with their empty calls for fiscal responsibility — were the least fiscally responsible in the way they operated their housing recovery plan along the Gulf Coast," Sen. Landrieu said. "With $7.2 billion, we could have repaired the total Katrina infrastructure damage in five parishes, which was $6.7 billion."

FEMA is still storing approximately 104,643 not-ready-for-dispatch trailers and mobile homes at 15 Temporary Staging Sites at a cost of $100 million each year.

Lawyers limited housing options: FEMA's narrow interpretation of its legal authority under the Stafford Act, the law that governs how the federal government responds to disasters, limited the assistance FEMA offered to displaced citizens.

"These lawyers found every way to say 'no' to the people of the Gulf Coast," Sen. Landrieu said.

These narrow legal interpretations led to the rejection of a program that would have allowed FEMA to repair rental units, an alternative to trailers that would keep people in their original communities. Strict legal interpretation also led FEMA to terminate emergency sheltering assistance after only six months, which resulted in a rushed and error-ridden transition between two types of housing assistance.

As many as a quarter-million people may have been unjustifiably denied housing assistance: When emergency sheltering ended, storm survivors were supposed to be transitioned into Section 408 assistance, which provides rental assistance, trailers and mobile homes to disaster victims. More than 520,000 applicants for this housing were deemed ineligible. When FEMA conducted a court-ordered review of 5,000 of these decisions, the agency found that more than 20 percent were denied eligibility in error. That means as many as 125,000 households may have been deemed ineligible in error.

The report's 10 pages of recommendations are the most thorough series of congressional reform proposals for post-disaster housing offered since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. They will be incorporated into Stafford Act reform legislation Sen. Landrieu plans to introduce in the near future.

Recommendations include encouraging rental repair, allowing HUD to take the lead on housing recovery, exploring the use of military repair teams following a disaster, giving FEMA additional legal authority under the Stafford Act, completing and implementing FEMA's National Disaster Housing Strategy, and creating operational plans for post-disaster housing.

A full copy of the report is available here.

A link to a spreadsheet on FEMA's Housing and Shelter Obligations here.